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Informed consent to research in neurological patients pre-
sents unique challenges, as many neurological diseases
interfere directly with cognitive functions necessary for
consent. Chronic neurological conditions such as neurode-
generative illnessesmay slowly erode the capacity for mean-
ingful decision making, while acute neurological injury
frequently presents with impairments in consciousness or
language that prevent the exchange of information that
informed consent presumes. Even when patients’ capacity
to consent is not compromised by disease, the legal frame-
work that purports to guide consent to research remains in
need of greater development and coherence. This article
describes some of the problems facing clinicians conducting
human subject research on neurological diseases, and
reviews ethical and legal principles governing consent for
research participation.
Decisional Capacity
Informed consent is conventionally grounded in the ethical
principle of autonomy.1 The principle of autonomy stems
both from particulars of U.S. law, which entitles adults to
authority and freedom from interference over their persons
and property, and from ethical recognition of the central
importance of patients’ values and preferences.2 Autonomy
presumes intact capacity to make meaningful decisions. U.S.
law strongly presumes that decisions made by adults con-
cerning their own medical care and body are autonomous
and must therefore be recognized. At the same time, the law
also grants clinicians substantial authority to determine
when patients lack capacity within the clinical setting.3
Early legal and clinical approaches tended to treat neu-
rological and psychiatric disabilities in an all-or-none fash-
ion. In this setting, a ﬁnding of patient “incompetence”
typically reﬂected a global determination that the patient
was unable to manage his or her affairs, resulting in a
virtually complete loss of civil rights.4 However, over time
it has become clear that many patients with compromised
neurological function have sufﬁcient ability to make some
decisions (such as appointing a proxy or taking medication),
even if they are unable to make others (such as in checkbook
management).5 Thus, in both clinical and legal settings,
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global determinations of incompetence have become disfa-
vored. In contemporary approaches, decision-making ability
cannot be determined on the basis of a diagnosis but must be
functionally assessed on a case-by-case basis.6 Two patients
at different stages of Alzheimer’s disease, for instance, may
retain disparate degrees of capacity depending on the deci-
sion to be made. One patient may clearly display capacity to
consent to research or a complex medical treatment,
whereas the second patient may not. The second patient,
however, may still retain capacity to consent to low-risk
procedures or other proposed therapeutic interventions
consistent with values he or she is still able to express.
The problem of assessing capacity for consent, however, is
compounded by the absence of federal legal standards for
making such an assessment.1 The legal standards for capacity
have, instead, been left to states, predictably resulting in
wide variation. States disagree, for instance, as to whether
the degree of capacity required for consenting to a proposed
treatment (conventionally understood as a health care deci-
sion) is the same as the standard for appointing a proxy to
make health care decisions.7 To address this legal variation
while simultaneously recognizing the widespread adoption
of the ethical principles undergirding the capacity require-
ment, clinicians have abstracted standards from existing
statutes for consent to medical treatment and applied
them to consent to research. These standards identify four
abilities necessary for capacity to consent to treatment:
understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and the expression
of choice.1,6 Though these are standards for treatment, rather
than research, they have largely been imported into the
research context and, in most cases, can be used to guide
the conduct of investigators.3
“Understanding” refers to a patient’s ability to grasp the
basic facts surrounding a medical decision—such as the
nature of the condition, the proposed treatment, and possi-
ble risks and beneﬁts. “Appreciation” refers to the patient’s
ability to apply thesebasic facts to her own case. For instance,
does the patient recognize that her physicians have diag-
nosed her with a condition that is fatal, if untreated, but then
insist that she is not ill? That patient may possess under-
standing without appreciation. Anosognosia following neu-
rological injury is a common source of such a discrepancy
between understanding and appreciation. The “reasoning”
requirement addresses the patient’s ability to logically
manipulate information, such as comparing the possible
likely outcomes of various treatment options. Lastly, the
patient must be able to “express a choice,” which requires
not only articulation of a treatment preference but also
relative stability of that preference in the absence of new
information. A locked-in patient might be able to under-
stand, appreciate, and reason, yet still could lack capacity if
unable to reliably articulate treatment preferences. Similarly,
patients with ﬂuctuating deliriumwho can articulate choice
but cannot maintain a treatment preference would lack
capacity under this criterion.1,4,6
Importantly, there is no requirement embedded in any of
the four elements of consent that patients’ preferences be
“reasonable” or match any existing medical consensus.
Courts ask only whether patients followed a rational pro-
cess—whether their conclusions follow from their stated
premises—in reaching decisions that may be deemed
unsound by clinicians or researchers. In re Milton, a 1987
Ohio Supreme Court case provides a striking example.8 In
Milton, a 53-year-old woman with a history of psychiatric
symptoms refused treatment for her uterine cancer on the
grounds that a local faith healer, whom she incorrectly
believed to be her husband, would cure her. The patient
demonstrated both understanding and appreciation of her
physician’s conclusion that without medical treatment she
would likely die. The court reasoned that the patient’s
religious belief in faith healing stood apart fromher apparent
delusions regarding her marriage. Additionally, because her
conduct was consistent with her religious convictions, the
court could not compel her to undergomedical treatment, no
matter how “unwise, foolish, or ridiculous” legal or medical
experts considered her beliefs to be. Clinicians who ﬁnd
themselves in similar situations should therefore recognize
that the prevailing legal standard errs on the side of preser-
ving autonomy in cases of unconventional decision making.
Expression of unusual preferences are broadly considered
reﬂections of patients’ subjective preferences, even though
such unorthodoxy might be a subtle manifestation of under-
lying frontal lobe dysfunction or other neurological
disorder.3
It bears emphasizing that there is no clear legal standard
speciﬁcally tailored to determining capacity to consent to
research. While the underlying principles guiding consent
for treatment—autonomy and the right to physical integrity
—remain foundational in the research realm and are
enshrined in the federal Common Rule, current regulations
are silent on the boundary between capacity and incapacity
in research subjects.9 It therefore remains uncertain pre-
cisely when proxy consent may be appropriate, though 2017
Revisions to the Common Rule have at least clariﬁed who
may provide that consent for cognitively impaired subjects
(discussed in more detail below).10
Several advisory commissionswithout power tomake law
have proposed guidelines tailored to determining capacity
for research consent, though these have not achieved broad
consensus. The National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC), for example, has proposed that capacity to consent
to research requires the ability to “understand the purpose,
risks, and possible beneﬁts” of a study.11 This standard is
notable for requiring research subjects to understand the
purpose of a study in which their enrollment is sought. The
NBAC proposal illustrates that meaningful consent to
research may require elements that are not shared with
consent to clinical treatment.
Empirical Research on Capacity to Consent
and Standardized Instruments
A long-standing challenge for research consent has been the
consistent interpretation of decision-making abilities across
clinicians under the four-pronged test for consent described
earlier. Early empirical work on the topic found that
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clinicians rendered consistent capacity judgments on normal
older controls (κ¼ 1.0) but highly inconsistent judgments for
patients with mild Alzheimer’s disease (κ ¼ 0.14).12 A 1994
study that surveyed 823 Massachusetts internists, surgeons,
and psychiatrists similarly found that while 89% of respon-
dents knew the correct standard for competence, most
incorrectly believed that diagnoses of dementia or psychosis
were sufﬁcient to establish incompetence.13 Such inconsis-
tency is problematic, as it may lead to biased and unwar-
ranted deprivation of patient decision-making authority.
Early investigators also assessed whether commonly used
cognitive batteries such as the Mini-Mental State Examina-
tion (MMSE) could be used to standardize capacity assess-
ments. Though MMSE scores correlate with expert
assessments of capacity at the extremes, the results provide
little information when the scores occupy the middle range,
where assessment instruments would be most useful. For
instance, MMSE scores below 19 are highly likely to be
associated with incapacity, but studies disagree over how
to interpret scores above 23.14–16
Following these early studies, several validated instru-
ments, used primarily as research tools, have been developed
for assessing capacity. These instruments are based on the
clinical framework for capacity described earlier but cannot
by themselves render judgment as to whether a patient has
capacity to consent to treatment or research. Instead, these
instruments purport to measure the cognitive functions—
understanding, appreciation, reasoning, stable expression of
a choice—on which a clinical judgment of capacity is based.
The clinician must then assess the results in the context of
other data available about the patient to make a ﬁnal
determination as to the patient’s capacity. Despite the ele-
ment of subjectivity inherent in incorporating instrument
data into clinical judgment, instrument-aided assessment is
associatedwith a higher degree of interrater agreement than
unaided assessment.17 Among the most widely adopted and
studied instruments are the MacArthur Competence Assess-
ment Tools for Treatment (MacCAT-T), the MacArthur Com-
petence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR),
and the Capacity to Consent to Treatment Instrument
(CCTI).18–20 The CCTI describes two hypothetical scenarios,
whereas the two MacCAT instruments require providing
information about the immediate medical intervention or
study to which the patient must consent. The CCTI therefore
allowsgreater comparison across raters or institutions,while
the MacCAT instruments are more applicable to actual
clinical cases. All three instruments use a standard series
of questions to measure each of the four decisional abilities
that together constitute capacity.
Informed Consent for Research Subjects
without Capacity
If a patient has capacity to consent to research participation,
the following elements of informed consent must be satis-
ﬁed: the patient must (1) voluntarily authorize a plan, based
on (2) a recommendation by the clinician or researcher, (3)
the nature of which plan has been described, for which (4)
risks, beneﬁts, and alternatives have been disclosed and for
which (5) the patient has demonstrated understanding.21
When encountering patients who lack capacity, priority
should ﬁrst be given to their explicit wishes (including
through the explicit designation of a surrogate decision
maker whom the patient authorizes to decide on his or
her behalf) and, second, to their beliefs and values, which a
default surrogate may assist in articulating.22 In the treat-
ment setting, after failure to discern patient beliefs and
values, clinical decisions sometimes must be made based
on a judgment of their best interests, though this standard is
usually inapplicable for the research context where inter-
ventions are not strictly intended to promote participant’s
health or welfare.
If a patient’s prior wishes (e.g., to enroll in clinical trials for
treatments of late-stage Alzheimer’s disease) can in fact be
ascertained, they should be followed. Such wishes may be
found in the patients’ written advance directives. Advance
directives may take two forms: living wills (“instruction
directives”), which outline the treatments a patient would
or would not want to receive in a given situation, and durable
powers of attorney (“proxy directives”), which designate a
surrogate decisionmaker to act on the patient’s behalf and in
amanner consistent with the patient’s own values and goals.
The degree towhich advance directives empower surrogates
to make research decisions will likely vary across jurisdic-
tions, though the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has
endorsed their use for dementia research.23 Both forms of
advance directives have notable limitations. Living wills
frequently fail to anticipate the precise clinical situation in
which a decision is to be made and therefore require extra-
polation from the patient’s known values. Though proxy
directives allow for greater ﬂexibility by delegating decision
making to a surrogate, research on decisions made by
common surrogates—spouses and children—ﬁnds that they
anticipate patient preferences at lower than expected
rates.24 Where recommendations are possible, proxy direc-
tives are considered preferable to living wills, as the mis-
match between surrogate and patient values can often be
resolved through discussion, whereas the narrow language
of most living wills precludes the kind of extrapolation that
clinical situations frequently require.22
Where the patient’s wishes are not available, priority
must be given to the patient’s beliefs and values. This priority
is sometimes grounded in the principle of autonomy (i.e., the
patient’s self-determination as articulated when the patient
had capacity) or, as Kim has argued, in the principle of
authenticity (the congruence between a person’s known
values and a decision where the patient’s exercise of self-
determination is impossible).25 In the research setting, it is
important to gauge whether participation in a given study is
concordant with a patient’s values.Was the patient known to
have reservations about the use of gene therapies to treat
disease or general privacy concerns that would be incompa-
tible with a study protocol? Conversely, was the patient
broadly enthusiastic about engaging in the research enter-
prise if it meant generating new knowledge about his or her
disease?
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Patient values regarding research-relevant questions may
have been expressed to treating physicians prior to incapa-
city or, more commonly, be inferred by a surrogate once
capacity is lost. The most important ethical obligations for a
surrogate are knowledge of the patient’s goals and values as
well as a commitment to use the patient’s values (rather than
the surrogate’s) as a basis for making decisions. In other
words, the surrogate should attempt to make the decision
that the patient wouldmake if he or shewere able to do so—a
standard known as substituted judgment. In the absence of
proxy directives, the 2017 Revised Common Rule Code of
Federal Regulations clariﬁes that, where state law is silent on
research consent, individuals identiﬁed as appropriate for
surrogate decision making in the clinical context can also
serve as decision makers in the research context.26 In states
with lawgoverning clinical consent but not research consent,
rules for clinical surrogate priority are presumed to apply to
research. In jurisdictions without speciﬁc law, existing insti-
tutional practice for identifying clinical surrogates may be
importedwholesale into the research setting. As themajority
of states have codiﬁed rules for default surrogacy in the
clinical but not in the research setting, the 2017 revision
ﬁlled a gap in the earlier rule, which left the priority of
surrogate decisionmakers in the research context undeﬁned.
In four states—California, Kansas, New Jersey, and Oklahoma
—the law governing default surrogacy is applicable only to
the research context. These states give priority to spouses or
domestic partners, followed by adult children, parents, and
siblings—a pattern that largely holds in those states that have
drafted rules only for the treatment context. The precise
scope of decision-making authority also varies by state, even
among those few states that have adopted research-speciﬁc
rules. In California, for instance, the ability of default surro-
gates to provide consent is “restricted to medical experi-
ments that relate to the cognitive impairment, lack of
capacity, or serious, or life-threatening diseases and condi-
tions,” whereas the other three states permit surrogate
consent to protocols approved by institutional review boards
to which patients did not previously object.27–30 California
does not limit the allowable level of risk for nontherapeutic
research, whereas New Jersey requires the application of
speciﬁc risk/beneﬁt criteria to decisions. The American Bar
Association’s Commission on Law and Aging provides state-
by-state legislative summaries and other resources for
researchers seeking additional information.31 While
researchers should be aware of laws in their jurisdiction
applicable to the research enterprise, as those laws super-
sede institutional practice, their ethical obligation is primar-
ily to identify those individuals best able to represent the
patient’s values and goals.
Neurological Conditions in which Consent
Issues Often Arise
While the broad principles described earlier provide founda-
tions for approaching problems of consent, several neurolo-
gical conditions pose unique ethical and legal challenges for
researchers. Illustrative conditions include chronic diseases
such as Alzheimer’s disease, as well as more emergently
presenting conditions, such as epilepsy and stroke.
Exception from Informed Consent
Requirements for Status Epilepticus Trials
Several recent neurological trials in the United States—
including the pivotal Rapid Anticonvulsant Medication Prior
to Arrival Trial (RAMPART)—have been conducted under the
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Exception from
Informed Consent (EFIC) Requirements for Emergency
Research.32 The EFIC regulations apply only in the United
States andwere ﬁrst promulgated in 1996 to permit research
involving human subjects in need of emergency medical
interventions but whose ability to consent was impaired
due to life-threatening conditions.33 EFIC, moreover, applies
only where there is no reasonable way to identify prospec-
tively those individuals who would be eligible for participa-
tion in the study. EFIC sought to balance the need for research
on life-threatening conditions for which existing treatments
were unproven or unsatisfactory against the traditional prin-
ciples of autonomyand the right to physical integrity. The EFIC
regulations sought to effect this balance by imposing several
safeguards, including a requirement that the EFIC plan be
incorporated into an Investigational New Drug (IND) applica-
tion to the FDA; the ongoing concurrence of a licensed physi-
cian, not participating in the research, with the IRB; oversight
of an independent data monitoring committee; and, most
distinctively, a requirement for public disclosure and commu-
nity consultation prior to study approval and initiation.
Though the EFIC requirements have been embraced by the
emergency research community, they have not been clearly
deﬁned by regulatory agencies or other lawmaking bodies.
Particularly challenging have been the requirements for
public disclosure and community consultation. In recent
nonbinding recommendations, the FDA deﬁnes community
consultation as an activity “providing the opportunity for
discussing with, and soliciting opinions from, the commu-
nity in which the study will take place and the community
from which the study subjects will be drawn.”34 The com-
munity to be consulted, therefore, is deﬁned with respect to
geography and individuals affected by the investigated con-
dition. Where those communities do not overlap, the FDA
recommends consulting both groups. Notably, the FDA
recommendations acknowledge that community consulta-
tion is not a substitute for the mechanism of individual
consent. However, community consultation attempts to
serve the principle of respect for autonomy that underlies
individual consent by seeking input from those expected to
be similar to the study subjects—such as those who have or
are at risk for the condition under study.
EFIC regulations require investigators to seek out family
members of study participants within the therapeutic win-
dow to give them an opportunity to object to study inclusion.
Regulations do not require that the study protocol include
opt-out mechanisms for individuals who are likely to be
enrolled, though the FDA encourages their inclusion where
feasible. If opt-out mechanisms are included in the study
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protocol, they should be described during community con-
sultations. Examples of opt-out mechanisms employed in
EFIC studies include medical jewelry, wallet cards, and
driver’s license annotations.
While the community consultation requirement envi-
sions two-way communication between community mem-
bers and investigators, the public disclosure requirement is a
one-way dissemination of information about the study to the
affected community or communities. Public disclosure must
take place both before and after the study, with differing
goals. Prestudy disclosure must provide sufﬁcient informa-
tion “to allow a reasonable assumption that the broader
community is aware of the plans for the investigation, its
risks and expected beneﬁts… and the fact that the studywill
be conducted without obtaining informed consent from
most study subjects.”34 Poststudy disclosure must ensure
that affected communities are aware of the study results,
particularly so that future studies can account for the experi-
ences of vulnerable subjects who were not able to consent.
Despite the FDA recommendations, there remains contro-
versyconcerning themosteffectivewaytomeetEFICstandards.
The resulting uncertainty has elicited a rich literature on trial
designs attempting to complywith regulatory requirements as
well as empirical investigation into participant and surrogate
perspectives on EFIC enrollment.
The RAMPART trial, a multicenter study that compared
intravenous to intramuscular benzodiazepines for prehospi-
tal treatment of status epilepticus, represents one attempt to
satisfy regulatory requirements in a manner that allowed
innovation and reﬁnement of EFIC processes. RAMPART
investigators developed central resources, such as informed
consent forms; a template EFIC plan for FDA and IRB
approval; videos, brochures, and slides for use in public
disclosure and community consultation activities; a menu
of methods for disclosure and consultation along with
advantages and disadvantages of each; and a full-time
human subjects protection coordinator (HSPC) who lever-
aged experience across the trial network to address issues
unique to each trial site.35 These centralized resources
largely served as starting points for individual site investi-
gators, who could then tailor the resources to their respective
communities. Progress toward EFIC approval was centrally
tracked with a set of milestones and allowed documentation
of site-to-site variation. RAMPART investigators catalogued
the types of community consultation activities conducted as
well as the number of individuals reached by each type of
activity. Activities included setting up booths or exhibits,
random digit dialing, focus groups, internet surveys, and
calling into local radio shows. Public disclosure was achieved
through newspapers, radio, and television.
The RAMPART investigators described this approach as a
“federated” model that provides strong central guidance
while allowing local ﬂexibility, thereby allowing identiﬁca-
tion and development of best practices. Additionally, the
initial trial was followed by empirical research on the per-
spectives of study participants and their families. In one
study, researchers found that 82% of patients or surrogates
were glad that they or their family member had been
included in the study, and 95% felt that research on emer-
gency seizures was important.36 However, 17% of partici-
pants felt that their inclusion in the study was unacceptable.
There was a trend toward lower acceptance of EFIC among
non-white participants and those who had previously parti-
cipated in research. Additionally, multiple individuals raised
concerns about being approached for consent to follow-up
and data collection while still critically ill, suggesting that
attention to communication may affect study perception.
In another study, 90% of patients and surrogates perceived
community consultation to be important, largely as a
method of obtaining feedback from the community for
improving the study and also as a means of facilitating trust
and respecting the community’s right to be informed.37
Participants also cited healthcare professionals (43%) and
individuals with a connection to the study condition, such as
patients or family members (41%), as the relevant “commu-
nity” for consultation efforts. Given the ambiguity of the FDA
guidelines, these results may suggest that the goals of com-
munity consultation and public disclosure may be achieved
by a more targeted approach, seeking those likely to be
involved in the study, rather than the geographic area in
which the study will take place.
Consent in Acute Stroke Trials
As with status epilepticus, stroke patients often present
emergently and may lack decision-making capacity due to
cognitive impairments. Moreover, the therapeutic window
treating ischemic stroke, either with thrombolysis or endo-
vascular thrombectomy, is limited, requiring a rapid deter-
mination as to whether the patients are eligible to receive
treatment. Conﬁrmation that they arewithin the therapeutic
window may be provided by someone appropriate for sur-
rogacy or who can provide contact information of someone
who can serve as a surrogate. At the same time, available
surrogate decision makers are often less willing to enroll
patients in clinical research than the patients themselves
would be if they retained capacity. The upshot of this latter
situation has been slow recruitment and therefore delayed
progress in the development of novel therapies.38
This mismatch between patient wishes and surrogate
behavior has encouraged experts to propose waiving the
requirement of written informed consent in acute stroke
trials. In the United States, studiesmay be eligible for waivers
of consent where (1) they present nomore thanminimal risk
to patients; (2) the waiver or alteration will not adversely
affect the rights and welfare of the participants; (3) the
research could not practicably be performed without the
waiver or alteration; and (4) whenever appropriate, the
participants will be provided with additional pertinent
information after participation.39 Recent empirical investi-
gation into the effect of waivers on recruitment in trials of
stroke treatments has found that waivers generally had no
effect on recruitment rates for trials comparing the effects of
different therapeutic interventions.40 However, based on a
limited sample, waivers did appear to facilitate studies of
systems-level interventions, for example, of delivery of
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thrombolysis in a mobile stroke unit with on-board imaging
and point-of-care laboratory testing instead of an emergency
department. It has been observed that the greatest reduc-
tions in strokemorbidity andmortality in the near termmay
come from improving these systems-level interventions,
suggesting a signiﬁcant possible beneﬁt for waivers of con-
sent in such contexts.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, empirical researchhas discovered
differences in the baseline characteristics of patients
enrolled via self versus proxy consent. Participants enrolled
by surrogate consent tend to be older, present with more
severe strokes, and are more frequently aphasic, suggesting
that an inﬂexible approach to informed consent may create
the potential for bias.41While, in the United States, surrogate
enrollment may account for up to 70% of study participants,
signiﬁcant variation exists across countries. In Germany, for
instance, only 33% of participants in acute stroke trials are
enrolled via proxy consent. In Denmark, the percentage falls
to 1%. This presents a particular concern for investigators
participating in multinational trials, who should consider
this variation and the bias it may introduce.
Declining Capacity in Alzheimer’s Disease
Unlike the emergency conditions described earlier, Alzhei-
mer’s disease is marked by cognitive impairments that
progress over the course of disease, rendering capacity
judgments both crucial and challenging, and highlighting
many of the ethical considerations described earlier. As even
mild disease can impair some aspects of decision making,
subjects may lose the ability to consent to complex research
trials in the early stages of disease. Empirical research has
found that even small declines in neuropsychological mea-
sures have been associated with decreased decisional capa-
city.42 In a study of 40 individuals withmeanMMSE scores of
28, 40% of patients were judged by experienced evaluators to
lack capacity to consent to participation in a clinical trial.43
Such results suggest that mild impairments can have sub-
stantial effects on capacity and also that signiﬁcant variation
in retained capacity exists among patients at the same stage
of illness, making functional case-by-case assessments a
necessity.
As disease progresses, obtaining valid informed consent
to research proves evenmore difﬁcult. For instance, in a 2011
study of patients judged to have mild to moderate Alzhei-
mer’s disease, less than 4% were judged to have the capacity
to participate in a neurosurgical trial.44Attempting to ensure
that all subjects in such a trial who possess capacity to
consent would likely be logistically impractical or produce
ungeneralizable results.
A bright spot in Alzheimer’s disease research on consent
has been the substantial preservation of capacity to appoint a
surrogate for consent to research. Recent research has found
that more than 90% of patients with early-stage Alzheimer’s
disease demonstrate capacity to appoint a research proxy.44
Additionally, the majority (55%) of those without capacity to
consent to a neurosurgical trial were found to have capacity
to appoint a surrogate. Importantly, some investigators have
observed that surrogates for patients with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease may show greater ﬁdelity in representing patient views
than surrogates for other conditions, as these patients retain
the ability to communicate about values and preferences
long into the disease course and remain in conversationwith
the surrogates about those values and preferences.45,46
Additional research has complemented this view, ﬁnding
that patients with Alzheimer’s disease are able to distinguish
between complex research decisions, which they prefer to
delegate to a proxy, and simpler decisions over which they
choose to retain control, citing a desire for autonomy.47
One proposed solution to the problem of declining capa-
city in this context is the use of an iterative consent process
that involves reevaluating consent capacity at multiple pre-
determined time points in the study.48 This may prove
particularly relevant in longitudinal trials that focus on
presymptomatic patients with known risk factors or biomar-
kers for the disease. The NIH has also recommended that
patients appoint legally authorized representatives at the
outset of a study, as many patients can be expected to lose
capacity before study termination.49
Emerging Ethical Issues
Several emerging ethical issues that may complicate or
extend the principles mentioned above also warrant discus-
sion, as they are likely to be encountered in future research
contexts and will need to be addressed before seeking
consent from study participants.
1. Adaptive trials:
Adaptive trials allow for modiﬁcation of a study as data
become available, so that changes in sample size, dosage, or
the number of treatment groups might occur before study
termination. The goals of such studies are to increase the
speed and lower the cost of trials, while reducing the number
of patients who receive placebos or ineffective treatments.50
To provide informed consent, researchers will need to inform
their patients that assignment is not based purely on chance
but on accumulating data, that likelihood of beneﬁt may be
associatedwith the time of enrollment, and that theymay be
randomized to a therapy forwhich evidence of inferiority has
been produced even before the trial ends. As a result,
researchers will need to be aware of two extreme possibi-
lities. First, some very knowledgeable research participants
mayattempt to “game the system” by postponing enrollment
to increase the likelihood of receiving an effective treatment,
which distorts the element of fairness captured by tradi-
tional randomization.48 Alternatively, as Saxman has argued,
given that traditional randomization has proven difﬁcult for
participants to comprehend, evenwith both oral andwritten
explanations, it is possible that comprehension of adaptive
randomization will be minimal, threatening autonomous
decision making.50,51
2. Cluster-randomized trials:
Cluster randomization occurs at the group level (e.g.,
clinic, nursing home) rather than at the individual level
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typical of randomized controlled trials. Cluster-randomized
trials (CRTs) are particularly useful for community-level
interventions, those that otherwise cannot be targeted to
speciﬁc individuals, or studies in which “contamination” of
the intervention across individuals will occur. For instance, a
study on the use of education materials to reduce anxiety in
early-stage Alzheimer’s patientsmay be compromised by the
tendency of regular patients in the same clinic to interact
with one another and share information.
Ethical challenges posed by CRTs largely arise for two
reasons: (1) determining the locus of consent for groups
remains difﬁcult (see related discussion concerning EFIC,
earlier) and (2) the group that serves as the target of inter-
vention may not be the same as the group from which data
are collected.52 In many CRTs, clinicians themselves may be
the target of intervention (e.g., by training in a new safety
protocol), while the outcome is measured by the effect on
patients. It is unclear whether patients must consent to data
collection, the intervention, or both, and the response of
ethical and regulatory bodies to CRTs has been inconsistent
across jurisdictions. A recent CRT investigating stroke pre-
vention after transient ischemic attacks measured the effect
of a decision support tool used by general practitioners in
New Zealand on 90-day stroke risk in their patients. While
patients were not blinded to the study, individual patient
consent was not required by the ethics committee, “because
the unit of interventionwas general practices and individual
patient data were completely de-identiﬁed.”53
In contrast, the Michigan Health and Hospital Association
Keystone ICU study—though not formally a CRT—also tar-
geted health professionals with educational and other qual-
ity-improvement interventions designed to reduce rates of
catheter-associated infections. The approving ethics com-
mittee concluded that the studymerely involved the analysis
of de-identiﬁed information and therefore did not require
patient or provider consent. Shortly after the study’s pub-
lication, however, the U.S. Ofﬁce for Human Research Protec-
tions found that the ethics committee’s conclusion had been
incorrect and that informed consent should have been
obtained from both healthcare professionals and patients
or their proxies.54
A more recent controversy over the application of cluster
consent emerged in the HeadPoST trial, which examined
whether head position after acute strokewas associatedwith
outcomes at 90 days. In HeadPoST, hospital executives
sought institutional consent prospectively and individual
patient consent only after intervention for data collection
and follow-up, even though an intervention—head position—
was targeted directly toward patients. This method of con-
sent was approved by ethics committees in 114 hospitals on
grounds that it minimized recruitment, selection, and
responder bias; facilitated rapid implementation in the
chaotic emergency setting; and was low risk. Responses to
the arguments proffered by the study authors observed that
minimizing bias could serve as a basis for forgoing consent in
any clinical trial, that interventions were initiated a median
of 7 hours after hospital arrival, and the intervention did not
unambiguously pose minimal risk.55
As the aforementioned examples demonstrate, there exist
no clear federal requirements or regulatory guidelines on the
appropriatemanner of obtaining consent in CRTs.Weijer et al
and McRae et al have proposed applying existing waiver of
consent regulations (described earlier) to CRTs, so that
cluster randomization and de-identiﬁcation do not per se
permit investigators to avoid seeking patient consent.52,56
Instead, investigators would be required to evaluate the
proposed intervention’s risks to patients and the practic-
ability of acquiring consent without compromising the inter-
vention before determining whether and what kind of
consent may be necessary. The Ottawa Statement on the
ethical design of CRTS, a consensus statement issued in 2012,
proposes that all CRT “research participants” should be
consented before randomization whenever feasible or as
soon as practicable after randomization.57,58 The term
“research participant” is deﬁned to include those directly
intervened upon, those interacting with investigators for
data collection, and those about whom identiﬁable informa-
tion is used to generate data. The Statement authors concede
that waivers of consent may often be required in cluster-
designed trials but should be reserved for situations inwhich
the study would not otherwise be feasible and the risks to
participants are minimal. Additionally, the Ottawa State-
ment emphasizes that special care should be taken to iden-
tify and acquire the consent of subjects with impaired
decisional capacity, particularly those whose presence
within a cluster may not be obvious.
3. Biomarkers for Alzheimer’s disease:
Asymptomatic patients may increasingly request amyloid
biomarker testing to gauge their susceptibility for Alzhei-
mer’s disease. Informed consent for such testing requires full
disclosure of the associated risks, which may be primarily
legal andﬁnancial.59 Currently, there are no legal protections
in place for patients who test positive for amyloid biomar-
kers. Biomarker data are not protected under the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), as biomarkers
are not genetic information. Nor are they protected under
nondiscrimination provisions in the Affordable Care Act, as
biomarkers do not necessarily indicate the presence of a
preexisting condition. Additionally, there are no federal legal
prohibitions against long-term care or employment discri-
mination on the basis of biomarker information. Researchers
conducting studies in which the risk of biomarker disclosure
is high should therefore counsel patients on the attendant
legal risk such information may pose.
Conclusion
Neurological patients constitute a uniquely vulnerable popu-
lation in the research setting. Neurological conditions often
compromise capacity to consent, and individual variation in
deﬁcits calls for case-by-case functional assessment of capa-
city. At the same time, the limited availability of treatments
for these conditions can be remedied only by further
research with neurological patients. Additionally, the cano-
nical ethical principles of justice and autonomy suggest that
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individuals who lack the full range of decisional capacities
should not be excluded from the research enterprisewithout
due consideration of their retained abilities and their pre-
ferences. The aforementioned discussion should provide
researchers guidance in making those considerations, while
also pointing toward issues that may shape the emerging
ethical landscape.
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